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Who Speaks for the Working Poor?: A
Preliminary Look at the Emerging Tetralogy of
Representation of Low-Wage Service Workers
Alan Hyde

Abstract

Recent advocacy campaigns for low-wage service workers in New York City reveal a new pattern of representation by legal avocacy groups (like National Employment Law Project or law school clinics), governmental actors (like the state
Attorney General or New York City Council), and immigrant rights groups. Such
campaigns have won important economic and legal victories for Mexican workers in Korean greengroceries, West African delivery personnel for supermarkets
and drug chains, and domestic workers. They have not, however, institutionalized
workplace or political representation for these groups. Unions have either been
passive, outmaneuvered, or played negative roles in these campaigns. This pattern of representation is likely to continue, but, given the incentives of the various
actors, unlikely to produce stable patterns of representation.

Who Speaks for the Working Poor?: A Preliminary Look at the Emerging
Tetralogy of Representation of Low-Wage Service Workers
by Alan Hyde
Alan Hyde is a Professor and the Sidney Reitman Scholar, at Rutgers, The State University of
New Jersey School of Law, Newark. This paper will appear in 13 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND
PUBLIC POLICY #3 (September 2004).

This article will address one component of the emerging structure of low wage,
contingent work, a new pattern of worker representation that has not previously been noted–one
in which low-wage service workers are represented by a tetralogy of interacting institutions:
unions, government, legal advocacy groups, and ethnic groups.
While some contributions to this Symposium employ a broader definition of the new
workforce, I will confine my remarks to low-wage service jobs, the only kind of job to grow
numerically in the United States during the past decade or more.1 While such jobs are
sometimes referred to as “post-Taylorist,” this seems a mistake to me. On the contrary, their
growth has been fueled by the discovery that services jobs may be as minutely subdivided and
monitored as industrial jobs, thus permitting employers to fill them with contingent workers who
will shortly move on to other jobs.
Consider, for example, the maid service for which Barbara Ehrenreich worked briefly, in
which maids are required to carry four rags, one placed in each of four pockets of their uniforms.
This is classic Taylorist work organization. Ehrenreich shows that the methods of this company
did not ensure particularly clean houses, and, in fact, were quite ineffective at eliminating

1

See generally STEPHEN A. HERZENBERG, JOHN A. ALIC, & HOWARD WIAL, NEW RULES FOR A NEW ECONOMY:
EMPLOYMENT AND OPPORTUNITY IN POSTINDUSTRIAL AMERICA (1998). I have recently examined at length aspects
of work by high-end workers who change jobs frequently. ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC
AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF A HIGH-VELOCITY LABOR MARKET (2003).
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bacteria. However, this kind of minute work definition permits a company to control its existing
workforce by eliminating any discretion in the worker and thus easily integrate a constant stream
of new workers.2
The call center is the epitome of the new Taylorist service job. Perhaps 4.0 million
workers in the United States alone, constituting 3.0 percent of the labor force, work on
telephones answering customer requests and complaints and taking orders.3 These workers must
employ prescribed scripts, and a call center worker who assists a customer without referring to
the script is regarded as an organizational failure.4 Not surprisingly, these jobs, too, can thus
accommodate an ever-changing workforce, and may also be easily shipped to India or elsewhere.
The growth of these short-term service jobs challenges our entire system of labor and

2

BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMED: ON (NOT) GETTING BY IN AMERICA 70-119 (2001)(“When
you enter a house, you spray a white rag with Windex and place it in the left pocket of your green apron. Another
rag, sprayed with disinfectant, goes into the middle pocket, and a yellow rag bearing wood polish in the right-hand
pocket. A dry rag, for buffing surfaces, occupies the right-hand pocket of your slacks.”).
3
The government does not collect data specifically on employees in call centers. I constructed a crude
estimate by visiting the most recent news bulletin by the Bureau of Labor Statistics on Occupational Employment
and Wages for 2003 (released Apr. 30, 2004), available at www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ocwage.pdf, and adding
the following categories of workers:
Telemarketers
404,150
Customer service representatives
1,902,850
Order clerks
303,320
Reservation and transportation clerks
165,990
Computer support specialists
482,990
Insurance claims clerks
234,580
Bill and account clerks
417, 100
TOTAL:
3, 910,980
Total US workforce:
Percent:

127, 567, 910
~3.0%

This figure includes some people who do not work in call centers, but leaves out others listed in other sectors (for
example, health care) who do. By comparison, the same series found only 10.5 million production workers in the
entire U.S. manufacturing sector. www.bls.gov/oes , “Latest Numbers” (May 2003 Survey).
4
SIMON HEAD, THE NEW RUTHLESS ECONOMY: WORK AND POWER IN THE DIGITAL AGE 87 (2003)
(“Sharna F. Kahn, a senior project manager at KPMG Consultants defines a deficient [Customer Relations
Management] software product as one that is so slow that ‘agents [come] up with their own solutions for the
customer.’”) quoting Sharna Kahn, Redefining Call Center Metrics: The Quality Connection, CCS (Jan. 1999) at 2,
available at www.tmcnet.com/articles/ccsmag/0199/0199kpmg.htm.
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employment law in ways that scholars, this author included, have only begun to explore. It is no
exaggeration to say that our entire system of labor and employment law is premised on the
picture of a worker who works every day at the same place and for the same employer, a model
increasingly at odds with reality. A stable workplace constructed of such workers can be the
foundation for a “bargaining unit” in a labor law system that primarily defines the boundaries of
workers’ rights to communicate with each other and to take group action. However, labor law
does not recognize worker communities consisting of the people in a large geographic area or
labor market who have been employed in a particular type of work for a number of different
employers over a long period of time; such as temporary office help or landscaping. The law of
retirement benefits offers some tax incentives for employers to offer such benefits, but there are
no incentives to offer them in the forms that are most secure for working people. Instead, the
law focuses mainly on making promises of retirement benefits nonforfeitable after five or ten
years, vesting schedules increasingly irrelevant to a workforce in which the median worker has
been with his or her current employer for barely three years.5 As a practical matter, antidiscrimination laws unintentionally apply mainly to incumbent employees, particularly those late
in their careers.6 They do not effectively reach refusals to hire and thus have little relevance in
industries structured to ensure that employees have few late-career employees.7

5

The median US worker has been with his or her current employer for 4 years (3.5 years for private sector
employees). At the turn of the decade the figure was as low as 3.4 years, having dropped steadily since the
government began measuring it in 1983, but many workers with low tenure have lost jobs or dropped out of the
labor force altogether in the past few years. The decline is of particular interest due to the size of the aging babyboom generation. An aging workforce would normally result in increased job tenures; instead, job tenures have
been dropping. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employee Tenure in 2004,
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/tenure.nr0.htm.
6
John J. Donahue & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43
STAN. L. REV. 983 (1991).
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When the editors of this Symposium first asked me to discuss collective bargaining in the
new economy, I responded that there wasn’t any. I was thinking of the fact that today’s lowwage, contingent jobs are usually not union jobs. Of course, most American jobs are not union
jobs.8

In the 1990s there were some significant union organizing successes in organizing low-

wage service workers, including the Justice for Janitors campaign of the Service Employees
International Union,9 the same union’s extraordinary campaign among home health care
attendants in Los Angeles County, which ended in the passage of new state legislation to create
quasi-public bargaining authorities,10 and the successful campaign in the same county to
organize dry-wall workers, the most numerically successful of the decade’s campaigns among
immigrant workers.11 The twenty-first century, however, has yet to bring successes on this
scale. No doubt this partly reflects aspects of labor law that impede union organizing, both
generally and among low-income service workers in particular.12 Unions have also explored

7

Id.
8

About 12.9 percent of the U.S. workforce is now represented by a union (down from 13.3 percent in
2002); about 8.2 percent of the private sector workforce is represented by a union. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Union Members in 2003, USDL 04-53 (Jan. 21, 2004), available at www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf.
9
Howard Wial, The Emerging Organizational Structure of Unionism in Low-Wage Services, 45 RUTGERS
L.REV. 671, 693-98 (1993); CHRISTOPHER L. ERICKSON ET AL., Justice for Janitors in Los Angeles and Beyond: A
New Form of Unionism in the 21st Century?, in THE CHANGING ROLE OF UNIONS: NEW FORMS OF REPRESENTATION
(Phanindra W. Wunnava ed. 2004); Jesús Martínez Saldaña, At the Periphery of Democracy: The Binational Politics
of Mexican Immigrants in Silicon Valley (1993), (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California,
Berkeley).
10
See Karl Klare, The Horizons of Transformative Labour and Employment Law, in LABOUR LAW IN AN
ERA OF GLOBALIZATION: TRANSFORMATIVE PRACTICES AND POSSIBILITIES 20-23 (Joanne Conaghan et al., eds.,
2002) (describing the campaign).
11
Michael Flagg, Unions Get a Wake-Up Call as Drywallers Achieve an Unlikely Victory, LOS ANGELES
TIMES, Nov. 8, 1992, at D3; Ruth Milkman & Kent Wong, Organizing the Wicked City: The 1992 Southern
California Drywall Strike, in ORGANIZING IMMIGRANTS: THE CHALLENGE FOR UNIONS IN CONTEMPORARY
CALIFORNIA 169-98 (Ruth Milkman ed. 2000).
12
Wial, supra note 9, 45 RUTGERS L.REV. at 706-38 (NLRB preference for small single-employer units
over larger geographic units; restrictions on union ability to create geographic or multiemployer bargaining; weak
protection for area standards picketing; restrictions on secondary pressure; limited use of joint employer liability;
ease with which employers may withdraw from multiemployer units; absence of provisions for extension of
collective bargaining agreements; weak privileges for worker associations that represent less than a majority); &
Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing Workplace for Labor and
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new organizational forms, such as operating their own temporary help agency in Silicon
Valley13, and supporting workers centers offering many services to immigrant workers.14
This Article will cast a different light on this question by examining three recent cases of
advocacy among low-wage service workers in the New York City area: employees, almost
entirely of Mexican origin, of Korean-owned greengrocers; deliverymen, mostly West African,
for supermarkets and drug chains; and domestic workers of all races and nationalities. In all
three cases, advocacy for these workers from traditional labor unions competed (or cooperated)
with three alternative representational institutions: legal advocacy groups such as the National
Employment Law Project (NELP) or law school clinics, ethnic or immigrant advocacy groups,
and public entities such as the New York State Attorney General or New York City Council.
While all three incidents were victories of sorts for the workers involved, none was a victory for
traditional union representation. In all three, unions were either outmaneuvered or otherwise
made to appear as unattractive alternatives, and none of the resolutions did anything to
strengthen future organizational representation, union or otherwise, of the workers involved.
The three examples described here may not represent a widespread trend, but that is not

Employment Law, 48 UCLA L.Rev. 519, 621-31 (2001)(bargaining units that exclude temporary workers,
arbitration, secondary boycott restrictions, definition of employee, limited successor liability) .
13
Chris Benner & Amy Dean, Labor in the New Economy: Lessons from Labor Organizing in Silicon
Valley, in NONSTANDARD WORK: THE NATURE AND CHALLENGE OF CHANGING EMPLOYMENT ARRANGEMENTS 361,
370-73 (Françoise Carré et al., eds., 2000) (describing Temporary Worker Employment Project); Hyde, supra note
1, at 175-76.
14

Janice Fine, Non-Union, Low-Wage Workers are Finding a Voice as Immigrant
Workers Centers Grow, LABOR NOTES (August 2003) at 5; Ruth Needleman, Building
Relationships for the Long Haul: Unions and Community-Based Groups Working Together to
Organize Low-Wage Workers, in ORGANIZING TO WIN: NEW RESEARCH ON UNION STRATEGIES
71-86 (Kate Bronfenbrenner et al eds. 1998); Immanuel Ness, Organizing Immigrant
Communities: UNITE=s Worker Center Strategy, in Id. 87-101.
.
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the aim of this article.15 The examples are offered in the interest of drawing attention to this
emerging tetralogy of representation, combining unions, legal advocacy, ethnic or immigrant
groups, and public officials.16 The pattern bristles with potential legal issues, some of which I
will point out and many of which will be left to the reader and to future cases to develop.

I. Mexican workers at Korean Greengrocers17

Greengrocers in New York City, estimated to include some two thousand stores, are
almost entirely owned by immigrants from Korea.

Many in the generation that immigrated

from Korea following reform of U.S. immigration laws in 1963 gravitated to small business
ownership. In New York City, Korean immigrants began opening small greengroceries in the
mid-1970s.18

Some 78% of these grocers had college degrees and had worked as engineers,

schoolteachers, administrators, and other occupations in Korea; only 6% had owned small

15

Caution is advised in interpreting this article’s treatment of these examples, since the present article is
mainly limited to publicly-available news and legal records. My students and I are conducting interviews for future,
in-depth analysis of these and related incidents of advocacy for low-wage workers.
16
The classical tetralogy, submitted for the prize in drama in Athens in the 5th pre-Christian century,
consisted of three tragedies and a satyr play. J.A. CUDDON, THE PENGUIN DICTIONARY OF LITERARY TERMS AND
LITERARY THEORY 962 (3d Ed. 1991). I do not mean to imply that one of the institutions representing low-wage
service workers will turn out to be a farce.
17

This section draws on research by Jung Kim, J.D. Rutgers 2003. See also
Matthew T. Bodie, The Potential for State Labor Law: The New York Greengrocer Code of
Conduct, 21 HOFSTRA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 183 (2003).

18

See generally ILLSOO KIM, NEW URBAN IMMIGRANTS: THE KOREAN COMMUNITY IN NEW YORK 112-21
(1981); Illsoo Kim, The Koreans: Small Business in an Urban Frontier, in NEW IMMIGRANTS IN NEW YORK 219-42
(Nancy Foner ed. 1987).

6
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art12

businesses there.19 In their early years, these businesses typically were family-run and employed
few others. As family members developed other interests, they began to hire outside helpers, the
vast majority of whom were immigrants from Mexico.
Korean grocers enjoyed a competitive advantage over similar businesses due in part in
the long hours kept by the stores and worked by the owners. Reports soon surfaced of similar
hours being demanded of employees – conduct that violated the Fair Labor Standards Act.20
When the State Attorney General settled the first such violation, workers at two groceries were
found to have worked an average 72 hours per week without overtime pay. Their weekly
salaries of $180-360 worked out to an hourly wage between $2.80 and $3.60 per hour at a time
when the relevant statutory minimum was $5.15 per hour.21
In May of 1998, two years prior to this settlement, Local 169, UNITE, began an
organizing campaign among greengrocer workers.22 While this local had not traditionally
represented workers in retail groceries, its leadership included many Latinos.23 The campaign
included boisterous sidewalk demonstrations (with mariachi bands) outside some prominentlypositioned Manhattan groceries, creating some public pressure for resolution.24 Matters
escalated as at least one grocery signed a union contract with a different union, creating rivalries

19

Ronald Takaki, The Myth of the Successful Koreatown Grocer: Spike Lee’s Camera Misses an Important
Angle, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Aug. 20, 1989), available at http://modelminority.com/printout288.html.
20
29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. The FLSA requires, at § 7(a)(1), one-and-a-half times regular pay for hours
beyond forty per week. 20 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2004).
21
Press release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Greengrocers Settle Labor Abuse
Charges (Aug. 30, 2000), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2000/aug/aug30a_00.html.
22
UNITE stands for Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees.
23
Indeed, Local 169's claim of jurisdiction was controversial. Around the time of the adoption of the
Greengrocer Code of Conduct in September of 2002, Local 169 relinquished jurisdiction over greengrocers to Local
1500, United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW). Telephone interview with Mike Donovan, Research and
Education Director, Local 169, (February 20, 2004).
24
Andrew Jacobs, Not a Horn of Plenty, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 1998), at 14-4.
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among the groceries and increasing crowd levels.25
Resolution of sorts came almost four years after the start of the union drive in the form of
a peculiar agreement brokered by the office of the New York State Attorney General, who (as we
shall see further) had taken an active role in representing low-wage workers.26

Local 169 had

reported violations of labor standards to that office, which had won back pay for some
employees.27

As part of this agreement, the Greengrocer Code of Conduct was announced on

September 17, 2002.28

The Code affects only greengrocers who voluntarily agree to abide by

its provisions.29 Those who do pledge to comply with federal and state minimum wage and
overtime standards and state and federal labor law.30 The only new legal requirements imposed
on employers by the Code are an agreement to provide employees with sick and vacation days,31
attend educational training sessions on labor law, allow employees to attend similar sessions,
and submit to monitoring of payroll records.

The Code also creates a Code of Conduct

Committee, comprised of employer and employee representatives and a representative selected

25

Tom Robbins, The Sweetheart Union, VILLAGE VOICE (March 27, 2001). The union was Local 1964 of
the International Longshoremen’s Association, a catchall local based in Ridgefield Park, NJ.
26
See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Waging War, From Wall Street to Corner Grocery: Beyond the HighProfile Cases, Spitzer Helps Low-Wage Workers, N.Y. TIMES (January 21, 2004) at B1.
27
See text supra note 21; see also Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer,
Spitzer and Consul General Announce Settlement of Labor Abuse Cases Against Greengroceries (November 20,
2001) available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2001/nov/nov20a_01.html. The initial decision to invoke the
state Attorney General was adventitious. The statute of limitations under the New York state labor standards law is
three years longer than the corresponding federal statute. Seminar presentation, Kevin Finnegan, Esq., Assistant
Director, Service Employees International Union State Council (formerly with Local 169, UNITE), February 23,
2004.
28
GREENGROCER CODE OF CONDUCT, available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/workplace/workplace.html .
29
As of March 2004, some 200 greengrocers have voluntarily agreed. Seminar presentation, Jennifer
Brand, Office of New York State Attorney General, March 30, 2004. There is no mechanism for imposing the Code
on all members of the trade association, as would be true of normal multi-employer bargaining. See generally
Douglas L. Leslie, Multiemployer Bargaining Rules, 75 VA.L.REV. 241 (1989).
30

Greengrocer Code of Conduct, supra note 28 at Art. I.
GREENGROCER CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 28 at I.15 (at least two paid sick days to each employee
who has worked for one year, and three to each employee after two years), I.16 (one workweek of paid vacation
days to each employee who has worked for one year).
31
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by the Attorney General. The Attorney General is given further authority to monitor workplaces
and payroll visits. However, grocers who sign an additional Assurance of Discontinuance are
assured that the Attorney General’s office “agrees to exercise its discretion to refrain from
investigating civil violations of the minimum wage and overtime laws...which occurred prior to
the signing of the Assurance.”32
In addition to the Attorney General, the Code was negotiated by the Korean American
Association of Greater New York and Korean American Produce Association (representing
employers) and by representatives from the state AFL-CIO (but not either Local 169 or Local
1500) and Casa Mexico (representing employees).33

Its two most striking features are its

weakness and its anomalous legal status, which are likely related.

The unions appear to have

obtained nothing from the agreement. In fact, the Code appears to have halted, rather than
assisted, union organizing; no new greengrocers have recognized Local 1500 since the Code was
signed.34 The employers agreed only to comply with laws that bound them anyway, and to grant
two sick days and a week of vacation each year. In exchange they received effective immunity
from prosecution for past violations. These prosecutions had previously resulted in settlements

32

Greengrocer Code of Conduct, supra note 28, at IV.
Steven Greenhouse, Korean Grocers Agree to Double Pay and Improve Workplace Conditions, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 18, 2002, at B1; Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Landmark
Code of Conduct to Improve Working Conditions in the Greengrocer Industry (September 17, 2002), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/sep/sep17a_02.html .
33

34

Seminar presentation, Jennifer Brand, New York State Attorney General, March
30, 2004. It is still not difficult to find Mexican immigrants who normally work an illegal 72hour week in greengroceries for which they are paid $200. The $450 weekly wage for groceries
complying with the Code of Conduct is pegged to the legal minimum wage and has not been
increased since the effective date of the Code. Andrew Kennis, Not All Greengrocer Workers
Reap Fruits of Victory, THE VILLAGER, April 7-13, 2004, at 12; Steven Greenhouse & Seth
Kugel, Labor Truce Wearing Thin for Koreans and Mexicans, NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER
27, 2004, AT B3..
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of over $600,000 against just six greengrocers.35
What is the legal status of this agreement? It is not a collective bargaining agreement.
Employees selected neither the union representatives from the state AFL-CIO nor Casa Mexico
to represent them. While employers may voluntarily recognize a union as the exclusive
representative of its workforce, they violate the National Labor Relations Act if that union does
not in fact represent a majority of employees in the bargaining unit. Neither the AFL-CIO, Casa
Mexico, nor the locals could make that showing here.36

At the time the Code was promulgated,

Local 169 reportedly represented workers at only seven groceries, and, as mentioned, was in the
process of withdrawing from that industry.37 It is true that the grocers might lawfully have
recognized the unions merely as representatives of their own members. However, the agreement
applies to all employees, not just union members.38

Under federal labor law, collective

agreements are negotiated by a union with representatives that may be replaced at governmentrun elections,39 that must elect officers and otherwise observe internal democracy,40 and that
owes all those it represents a duty of fair representation.41 The state AFL-CIO that signed the
Code was not elected by greengrocer workers, cannot be replaced by them, faces no democratic

35

Press release, Spitzer and Consul General Announce Settlement of Labor Abuse Cases Against
Greengroceries (November 20, 2001), supra note 27.
36
Nat’l Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2); Int’l Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union v.
NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961) (finding that § 8(a)(2) contains no scienter requirement and is violated when employer
recognizes union that employer believes, in good faith but mistakenly, represents a majority of the workforce).
37
Greenhouse, supra note 33.
38
Alan Hyde et al., After Smyrna: Rights and Powers of Unions that Represent Less than a Majority, 45
RUTGERS L.REV. 637 (1993). It remains unclear whether such agreements between an employer, and a union as
representative only of its members, are governed by state or federal law. Id. at 649 note 38. However, the Code of
Conduct does not appear to be such a “members only” agreement.
39
Nat’l Labor Relations Act § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159.
40
Labor-Mgmt. Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 401 et seq.
41
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (creating duty); Air Line Pilots Ass’n. v.
O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65 (1991) (standard for fair representation suits against union as contract negotiator).
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control from any rank-and-file workers and probably owes no duty of fair representation.42 It is
not surprising that they signed such an ineffective agreement in which the workers were
effectively represented, albeit barely, by governmental officials, not unions.43

II. The Delivery Workers Settlement

Delivery personnel for some New York City supermarkets and drugstores have recently
settled claims of labor standards violations, in which they were effectively represented solely by
advocacy groups and the state Attorney General, and in which labor unions played a distinctly
negative role.
In New York City, where people do not drive to the supermarket or discount drugstore,
delivery personnel or “walkers” deliver large orders to customers’ apartments or doormen. Until
recently, most walkers, who tend to be immigrants from West Africa, were treated as if they
were self-employed independent contractors, outside of labor or employment law. 44 Almost all
walkers were referred by either City Express Delivery, Hudson Delivery Services, or their alter
egos. However, both those companies, and of course the supermarkets themselves, denied being
the legal employers of the walkers.45 As the court found in the lawsuit involving walkers
referred by Hudson to the large Duane Reade discount drug chain, the walkers, “despite working
42

Hyde et al., supra note 38, at 651 note 42.
Other entities that purported to speak for the grocery workers have an even more shadowy existence. I
have not yet been able to interview anyone at Casa Mexico. A Google search reveals descriptions of it as an
advocacy organization for Mexican immigrants, but no additional examples of its representation of workers other
than the Greengrocer campaign. One should also mention that the November 2001 settlement, cited supra note 27,
was also announced jointly with the Consul-General of Mexico. Such direct relations between foreign governments
and American state or local government may be becoming more common and have suggested to some. See, e.g.,
Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO ST.L.J. 649, 692 note 166 (2002),
deeper changes in the effective Constitution as it concerns foreign affairs.
43
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eight to eleven hours a day, six days a week, were paid a flat rate of between $20-$30 per day,
well below minimum wage requirements.”46
A group of disgruntled walkers, some of whom had been bank tellers or other educated
workers in their homelands (for most of them, Mali), held some demonstrations outside stores in
October 1999. They had sought union support, but been rebuffed.47 The demonstrations were
not effective.48 Independently, another walker (from Senegal) had contacted the National
Employment Law Project (NELP), a legal advocacy group. NELP does not usually do class
action litigation and prefers to work with organizations, but, after concluding that the walkers
were nowhere near organizing, they decided that they had to do something and enlisted the New
York State Attorney General.49 Lawyers from NELP, joined by the state Attorney General, sued
the delivery companies and retailers in January 2000.
The suit involved difficult legal questions about the employment status of the walkers
and ended in victory for them on all the legal issues. The district court held that the walkers
were employees, not independent contractors, applying the multi-factor “economic realities” test
appropriate to the FLSA.50 The court further held that the owners of the agencies were

44

Ansoumana v. Gristede’s Operating Corp., 255 F.Supp.2d 184, 187 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Id.
46
Id.
47
They had contacted Local 1500, UFCW (the union that now has jurisdiction over greengrocers, supra
note 23, but has done little organizing there), under the mistaken belief that it represented employees of the
supermarkets. Local 1500 referred them to Local 338, RWDU/UFCW, the union that actually represents those
employees. Local 338 in turn told them that it had not done an organizing campaign in over thirty years. Seminar
presentation, Catherine Ruckelshaus, National Employment Law Project (March 9, 2004).
48
Andrew Jacobs, “Walkers” Make a Tentative Stand; African Deliverymen Complain, Gently, of a Tough
Job, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1999, at B1.
49
Seminar presentation, Catherine Ruckelshaus, National Employment Law Project (March 9, 2004).
50
Ansoumana, 255 F.Supp.2d at 188-92. The court found that: (1) the agencies controlled the workers; (2)
the workers had no opportunities for investment, profit, or loss; (3) no independent initiative was required; (4) the
permanence of the relationship was disputed; and (5) the services performed by the workers were not merely integral
to, but constitutive of, the business of the delivery services.
45
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individually liable for FLSA violations,51 and that the Duane Reade drug store chain was a “joint
employer” of the delivery personnel, jointly liable for any FLSA violations.52

Some eleven

months after this decision, the drug stores and the remaining supermarket defendants settled
plaintiffs’ claims for $3.2 million.53
While this was certainly effective representation of low-wage service workers by legal
advocacy and governmental organizations, they were not able to institutionalize future
representation for the delivery workers. Astonishingly, by then, they had a union. As the court
found, in March 2000, the delivery services signed a collective bargaining agreement with Local
338, Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Workers Union (RWDSU/UFCW), the union long
the representative of supermarket workers in the city (that had not conducted an organizing
campaign in over thirty years).54 The agreement provided that the delivery workers would be
paid minimum wage, $5.15 an hour; time and a half for overtime–that is, the legal minimum--;
and credited $1.65 an hour in presumed tips against the employer’s wage obligation.55 The
court’s holding, and the settlement brokered by NELP and the Attorney General, covered only
the period before March 2000–since, after that date, the walkers had (and still have) a union,
albeit one that seems to provide little advantage over being unrepresented.

Local 338 did not

participate in the litigation and its sole function seems to have been to provide a date for

51

Id. at 192-93. The individuals in question were founders, owners, and sole shareholders. Individual
liability in general is much easier to establish under the FLSA, with its expansive definition of “employer,” than
under other federal employment or labor statutes. See United States Department of Labor v. Cole Enters., Inc., 62
F.3d 775, 778 (6th Cir. 1995).
52
Ansoumana, 255 F.Supp.2d at 193-96. See Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (1947)
(slaughterhouse and subcontractor are joint employers of meat boners hired by contractor); Torrez-Lopez v. May,
111 F.3d 633, 642-44 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding farm owner and labor contractor joint employer of harvest workers
referred by contractor).
53
Steven Greenhouse, Gristede’s Deliverymen to Share in $3.2 Million Wage Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
18, 2003, at B2.
54
Seminar presentation, Catherine Ruckelshaus, supra note 47.
55
Ansoumana, 255 F.Supp.2d at 187-88.

13
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

terminating the employers’ responsibility.56
Accounts like this might suggest that advocacy by government and legal advocacy groups
might even be superior to union representation. Despite the negative role played by the union in
the delivery personnel case, I do not believe this conclusion is warranted. On the contrary,
advocacy, no matter how effective, that is limited to advocacy groups and public officials, has
difficulty institutionalizing itself beyond a single advocacy campaign. Our third case illustrates
the point. Legal and government advocates in New York City have recently achieved passage of
local legislation for domestic workers that effects little change, though it may turn out to be a
rehearsal for more effective state legislation.

III. New York City Local Law 33 (2003): Domestic Workers legislation

Workers in private homes–taking care of children, cleaning, and doing other household
labor–have long fallen outside the system of labor and employment laws.57

They are expressly

excluded from the National Labor Relations Act58 and, if they live in the home, the maximum
hours requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act.59 In 1950 domestic and household workers
56

Local 338 did appear to oppose NELP’s application for attorneys’ fees. Seminar presentation, Catherine
Ruckelshaus, NELP, March 9, 2004.
57
See generally Peggie R. Smith, Regulating Paid Household Work: Class, Gender, Race, and Agendas of
Reform, 48 AM. U.L. REV. 851 (1999)(reviewing attitudes of feminist and other social reformers towards domestic
workers and illustrating their unreliable commitment to reform)(hereafter Smith, Regulating); Peggie R. Smith,
Organizing the Unorganizable: Private Paid Household Workers and Approaches to Employee Representation, 79
N.C. L .REV. 45 (2000) (reviewing historical efforts at organizing these workers and improving their working
conditions)(hereafter Smith, Organizing).
58

National Labor Relations Act §2(3), 29 U.S.C. §152(3) (2004) (excluding from the definition of
“employee” “any individual . . . in the domestic service of any family or person at his home . . . . ”).
59
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(21) (1938) (excluding from the statutory
requirement of time and a half for hours over forty “any employee who is employed in domestic service in a
household and who resides in such household.”). Until 1974, domestic workers were entirely excluded from the
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were added to the Social Security System, so payments into the fund are supposed to be made for
them, whether they are considered employees or self-employed.60 For domestic workers who
are employees, as opposed to self-employed, employers are also supposed to deduct income tax
payments. However, household surveys reveal about 1.13 million employees in private homes,
while only about three hundred thousand households report household wages to the taxing
authorities.61 Clearly, even regarding household workers legally able to work, income is not
reported and payments to Social Security are not being made. Again, the reporting obligation
pertains both to independent contractors and employees.62 At worst, some domestic workers are
essentially kept in slavery, unable ever to leave the house, and given no days off.63
The leading player in current advocacy efforts is Domestic Workers United, a group
funded with money from George Soros that began as a project of Asian advocacy
organizations.64 Organizers decided to attempt to achieve a legislative victory after having
organized protest demonstrations against particular employers–interestingly, the same first
activity of the Mexican greengrocer and West African delivery employees. They enlisted the

FLSA, but amendments in that year brought them under the minimum wage provisions, and, for those who do not
live in the home in which they work, the maximum hours provision. Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55, 62 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(f) (minimum wage) & 207(1) (maximum
hours)).
60
EDWARD D. BERKOWITZ, AMERICA’S WELFARE STATE 58-60 (1991) (describing the process of
incorporating domestic workers into Social Security.).
61
Smith, Regulating, supra note 57, at 921 n.428; David Cay Johnston, Despite An Easing of Rules,
Millions Evade ‘Nanny Tax’, N.Y. TIMES, April 5, 1998, at 1.
62
Smith, Regulating, supra note 57, at 921 n.428 (quoting Internal Revenue Service analysis). Before
1994, half a million households reported payments to household labor. Id. In that year, Congress simplified the
reporting and payment requirements and added a line to the standard report of income filed by individual taxpayers
asking for the amount of taxes owed on wages paid to household help. Johnston, supra note 61. It was anticipated
that this would lead to more reports of such wages. Id. However, the changes had precisely the opposite effect, and
now only around three hundred thousand households report paying such wages. Id.
63
See, e.g., Manliguez v. Joseph, 226 F.Supp.2d 377 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (denying motion to dismiss suit under
Alien Tort Claims Act); Jennifer Sinco Kelleher, Domestic Workers Take a Stand: Rally in Support of 4-year-old
Dispute, NEWSDAY , Aug. 10, 2003, at A39.
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help of the Immigrants’ Rights Clinic at New York University to draft legislation.65 The New
York City Council, overwhelmingly Democratic and liberal, was much more politically
favorable terrain than state government, where Republicans control the state Senate and the
Governorship. However, the legislative authority of the City Council, as of any municipal
government, is limited by the local government law of the state. NYU students discovered that
the City did have jurisdiction to regulate employment agencies and had previously done so under
its authority over consumer protection.66 The result became Local Law 33 (2003), adopted by
the City Council in May 2003 and signed by the Mayor in June 2003.67
The law requires the City to prepare a statement of the rights of domestic workers and
requires employment agencies to give one to each applicant for household employment, and to
the employer.68 Agencies must also give domestic workers a full job description and keep

64

This paragraph is drawn largely from interviews with Councilmember Gale Brewer and Professor
Michael Wishnie. Seminar presentation, Gale Brewer, New York City Councilmember (Feb. 17, 2004); Interview
with Michael Wishnie, Professor, New York University School of Law (February 19, 2004).
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
The full text of the law is available at http://www.council.nyc.ny.us/pdf_files/bills/law03033.pdf.
68

§ 20-771 Statement of employee rights and employer obligations under state and
federal law. a. Every licensed employment agency under the jurisdiction of the
commissioner and engaged in the job placement of domestic or household employees
shall provide to each applicant for employment as a domestic or household employee and
his or her prospective employer, before job placement is arranged, a written statement
indicating the rights of such employee and the obligations of his or her employer under
state and federal law. Such statement of
rights and obligations shall embody provisions of state and federal laws that pertain to
domestic or household employees, both in their capacity as workers in New York state
and the United States and in their capacity specifically as domestic or household
employees in New York state and the United States. Such statement of rights and
obligations shall include, but not be limited to, a general description of employee rights
and employer obligations pursuant to laws regarding minimum wage, overtime and hours
of work, record keeping, social security payments, unemployment insurance coverage,
disability insurance coverage and workers' compensation.
Such statement of rights and obligations shall be prepared and distributed by the
commissioner to licensed employment agencies over which the commissioner has
jurisdiction.
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records. Violations of the statute may result in fines.69
The statute is unlikely to accomplish much on its own terms.70

The limitation to

agencies is an artifact of the City Council’s jurisdiction and severely circumscribes its
effectiveness. No one seems to have any good idea of the percentage of household workers in
the City referred by agencies, but it is undisputedly a minority.71 Agencies were not accused of
involvement in the horror cases amounting to slavery.72 In any case, the City Council did not
think it had authority to mandate particular working conditions, so did not attempt to do so. As
this Article is written, it is unclear whether the official statements of rights are in fact available at
employment agencies.73
Domestic Workers United did not regard the City legislation as a final accomplishment,
but rather a first effort at the legislative process. Its next priority is state legislation, still in the
planning stage. States retain the power to legislate particular terms of employment exceeding

Local Law 33 of 2003, § 20-771 (2003) (providing standards of conduct of employment agencies and employers of
domestic or household employees placed by employment agencies).
69

§20-772 Statement of job conditions; records. a. Every licensed employment agency
under the jurisdiction of the commissioner and engaged in the job placement of domestic
or household employees shall provide to each applicant for employment as a domestic or
household employee a written statement, in a form approved by the commissioner, of the
job conditions of each potential employment position to which the agency recommends
that the applicant apply. Each such statement shall fully and accurately describe the
nature and terms of employment, including the name and address of the person to whom
the applicant is to apply for such employment, the name and address of the person
authorizing the hiring for such position, wages, hours of work, the kind of services to be
performed and agency fee.
Id. at § 20-772.
70

The principal function of having the employers sign that they have read the statement of rights of
domestic workers is to negate the defenses, commonly raised in litigation under the FLSA, of good faith (affecting
liquidated damages) or that underpayment was not wilful (which affects the statute of limitations). E-mail
communication, Professor Michael Wishnie, March 1, 2004.
71
The estimate of 40% by Domestic Workers United seems very high. See Daniela Gerson, Union is
Seeking to Organize Child-Care Givers, NEW YORK SUN, Oct. 31, 2003, at 1.
72
Kelleher, supra note 63.
73
Seminar presentation, Councilmember Gale Brewer, Feb. 17, 2004 (reporting complaints to her office, awaiting
verification, that the statements of rights were not in fact available at employment agencies).
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the federal minima.74 Since domestic workers are excluded from the National Labor Relations
Act, states are also presumably free to legislate protection against retaliation for their
organizational activity and, though this is harder to imagine, procedures for collective
bargaining.75 Domestic Workers United maintains a recommended employment contract for
domestic employment on its web page.76 One possibility under discussion is to try to make this
contract mandatory through state legislation. For present purposes, its most interesting feature is
one of omission: it says nothing about organizational activity or affiliation by domestic workers.
It does not seek to provide organizational rights for Domestic Workers United, or any other
advocacy organization, or for any union that might become interested in organizing domestic
workers at some future time, an organizing campaign that would be governed entirely by state
law.77
I would suggest that, as with the greengrocer workers, the weakness so far in substantive
74

Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 §18(a), 29 U.S.C. §218(a) (1938) (“No provision of this chapter or of
any order thereunder shall excuse noncompliance with any Federal or State law or municipal ordinance establishing
a minimum wage higher than the minimum wage established under this chapter or a maximum workweek lower than
the maximum workweek established under this chapter,......”).
75
The exclusion of agricultural workers from the NLRA permits states to regulate their collective labor
activity. See United Farm Workers v. Arizona Agricultural Employment Relations Board, 669 F.2d 1249, 1257 (9th
Cir. 1982); and Willmar Poultry Co., Inc. v. Jones, 430 F.Supp. 573 (D. Minn. 1977). The same is true of teachers
in parochial schools. Christ the King Regional High School v. Culvert, 815 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that
the state labor board may assert jurisdiction over parochial schools excluded from NLRA). States, by contrast, are
not permitted to regulate the collective labor activity of groups as to which Congress or its designated agency
affirmatively desired an unregulated labor market, such as supervisors, compare Hanna Mining Co. v. District 2,
Marine Engineers Beneficial Ass’n, 382 U.S. 181 (1965) (states may enjoin organizational picketing by supervisors’
organization) with Beasley v. Food Fair of North Carolina, Inc., 416 U.S. 653 (1974) (states may not interfere with
employer’s federal privilege to discharge supervisors for union membership). The principle that explains all these
results is elusive, to put it mildly. My opinion, based on the review of the exclusion of domestic employees in
Smith, Organizing, supra note 57, 79 N.CAR.L.REV. at 62-64, is that they are more like agricultural workers and
parochial school teachers. That is, they are excluded from the Act due to political considerations and doubts (in
1935 or later) about Congress’s commerce power, not because Congress determined that their employers must be
privileged to fire them if they join an advocacy organization.
76
Available at http://www.caaav.org/downloads/Standard_Contract.pdf.
77
Traditional unions were not involved in the legislative process in the New York City Council. The
Service Employees International Union is attempting to maintain cordial relations with the movement of domestic
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protection for domestic workers mutually reinforces the weakness in the organizational rights of
their self-designated advocates. I say this precisely because of my high regard for the
intelligence, honesty, and ability of these advocacy organizations.

The historical experience of

advocacy groups like Domestic Workers United is that it is difficult for them to sustain
themselves.78 This is not merely a problem for their self-interest but puts limits on their potential
to achieve gains for those whom they claim to represent. They will be forced to accept crumbs
from the legislative process as their only source of legitimacy.
While these remarks are not the occasion to develop projects for the collective
representation of home workers, some models are available. As noted above, collective
bargaining already exists for some home workers and attendants paid with public money through
programs like Medicare.79 Employers could be encouraged, by signing the standard agreement,
to commit to periodic renegotiation of the agreement by representatives elected by employer
groups and the domestic workers. At the very least, however, the growth of representation of
domestic workers requires legal protection against retaliation for their joining groups like
Domestic Workers United.

IV. Conclusion

Most low-wage service jobs in the U.S. continue to be nonunion and involve nothing that
can be described as collective bargaining. Among the small minority of such workers that have

workers, and hosted a dinner for domestic workers recently. Seminar presentation, Councilmember Gale Brewer,
supra note 64.
78
See both articles by Peggie Smith, supra note 57, reviewing the long history but short lives of
organizations representing domestic workers.
79
Klare, supra note 10.
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sought representation, many of the emerging bargaining processes differ substantially from
traditional collective bargaining. At least four kinds of groups compete to represent low-wage
service workers: unions, government, legal advocacy organizations, and ethnic advocates.
Bargaining processes are complex, and the results for workers are so far tentative. Unions so far
have played either a negative role (Local 338 RWDSU for drug store delivery personnel), been
passive (Local 1500’s unwillingness to organize greengrocers despite winning jurisdiction; Local
169 UNITE’s withdrawal), or have been cut out (or cut themselves out) of deals that are
modestly favorable to workers but accord no rights to their organizations (the Greengrocer Code
of Conduct, the existing New York City law and the proposed state legislation on domestic
workers).
While unions have been passive and ineffective in the recent New York campaigns,
resolution has largely been driven by the alliance between legal or ethnic advocacy groups, and
governmental entities like the state Attorney General or City Council. The advocacy groups are
self-designated. Nobody elected them and they are not responsible to anyone. They have no
legal basis to compel their own recognition. Consequently, their legitimacy depends on their
ability to extract benefits from government, and they often must accept relatively small amounts.
The governmental entities, in turn, seem largely motivated by some public officials’ desire for a
favorable image as friends of poor workers. They have no institutional capacity or interest in
creating or sustaining systems of representation that will survive the particular advocacy
campaign. Indeed, for workers covered by the National Labor Relations Act, that is, delivery
workers and grocery workers (but not domestic workers), state and local governments are
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constitutionally preempted from creating or encouraging employee organization.80

Thus the

governments depend on the advocacy organizations to represent workers, as those organizations
depend on government to provide benefits that give them legitimacy.81
I am sorry to be so negative about the emerging tetralogy of representation, particularly
since most low-wage workers in the U.S. have no one to speak for them at all. No doubt the
dominance of advocacy and governmental organizations reflects the passivity of the unions in
New York. From the unions’ perspective, small shops like greengrocers, let alone domestic
workers, are expensive to organize and service. While this is true, it ignores the fact that just
these workers, like the delivery workers whom the union has treated so poorly, are prominent in
the public eye.

Many New Yorkers of all classes, certainly children, see few other low-wage

service workers as often as the household domestic, the assistant in the corner greengrocery, the
delivery man from the supermarket who comes to the apartment. They will form their opinion of
unions by how they treat the most visible low-wage workers.
Writing in his diary in 1941, Bertolt Brecht was both fascinated and repelled by the lack
of permanence of American theatrical production, in which he and other emigrés from fascism
were then employed. Groups of theater professionals would gather to mount a production,
disperse, and gather again. This fluidity, so unlike the German system of state theaters, made it
easy for him and his colleagues to become part of the industry. Yet, he wrote, “it is nomadic
theatre, by people on the move for people who are lost.”82

80

There do not appear to have been any recent attempts by states or local governments to create bargaining
structures for workers covered by the federal NLRA. The conclusion that they would be preempted from doing so is
a simple conclusion from the basic principles of preemption set out in San Diego Building Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
81
A representative of the Attorney General who spoke to my seminar referred to the alliance with advocacy
organizations as their preferred “model” of litigation. Jennifer Brand, supra note 52.
82
BERTOLT BRECHT, JOURNALS 166 (Hugh Rorrison trans., John Willett ed. 1993) (October 22, 1941).
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Today, the entire economy has become like the theater of Brecht’s time (and ours).
Certainly its fluidity continues to permit it to integrate today’s immigrants, not just German
playwrights or Indian software engineers, but, as we have seen, Mexican grocery workers, West
African delivery personnel, nannies and housekeepers from all over the world. But, in thinking
about how to prevent exploitation in this labor market, we may have to reverse Brecht’s
aphorism. Labor and employment law is now, increasingly, for people on the move. We who
make it must be sure that we are not lost.
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